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I. INTRODUCTION

The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) began with
good intentions. It was first enacted for the purpose of making flood
insurance reasonably affordable while protecting against losses after
disasters.1 However, Congress failed to accurately update the
program in the face of climate change and new coastal development.
Because of this oversight, the overall risk associated with the
program outgrew the collection of premiums, which led to an
enormous debt to be incurred by the federal government.2 Massive
storms came and went, repeatedly increasing the program’s already
insurmountable debt.3 Storms notwithstanding, coastal development
in vulnerable areas continued.4 Eventually, to address this challenge,
the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 was passed
with the general goal of updating flood maps, removing subsidies
that kept customers at the same price for decades, and increasing
premiums to accurately reflect current conditions.5
Unfortunately, the program failed to make any significant or
effective changes for many years. Once changes did finally come,
they led to massive increases in insurance rates and a massive public
outrage.6 Residents of states like Florida faced the possibility of
losing their homes because of skyrocketing insurance costs.7 As
soon as the five-year roll out of the act began, a group of senators
and representatives from both parties began to try to halt, delay, or
repeal the act.8 Eventually, delay of the reform was successful,

1. 42 U.S.C. § 4002(a)(6) (2014).
2. Dominic Spinelli, Reform of the National Flood Insurance Program: Congress Must Act
Before the Next Natural Disaster, 39 REAL EST. L.J. 430, 441 (2011).
3. Ledyard King, Rubio says he’ll vote to delay flood insurance hikes, USA TODAY, Jan. 10,
2014, 7:34 AM, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2014/01/10/flood-insurance-floridarate-hikes/4393799/.
4. See Christine M. McMillan, Federal Flood Insurance Policy: Making Matters Worse, 44
HOUS. L. REV. 471, 497-98 (2007).
5. See Eli Lehrer, Strange Bedfellows: SmarterSafer.Org and the Biggert-Waters Act of 2012,
23 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 351, 352 (2013).
6. See infra notes 124-127.
7. See Letter from Gov. Rick Scott, Florida, to President Barack Obama (Jan. 9, 2014), available
at http://www.flgov.com/2014/01/09/gov-scott-obama-failing-to-delay-nfip-law
-that-hurts-floridians-yet-delayed-healthcare-law/.
8. See Christopher Joyce, Federal Flood Insurance Program Drowning in Debt. Who will pay?,
NPR (Jan. 1, 2014), http://www.npr.org/2014/01/01/258706269/federal-flood-insurance-programdrowning-in-debt-who-will-pay.
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leading to a return to the former, unsustainable state of the NFIP.9
However, avoiding this massive problem is not a solution; this
article proposes several viable alternatives that would alleviate these
issues and solve the problems of the current NFIP.
First, an examination of the history of hurricane flooding in the
United States and its effects on Florida and other Southeastern states
is explored, which culminated in the creation of the NFIP. This is
followed by a summary of the NFIP’s organization and goals, and a
discussion of the record-breaking storms and ensuing problems that
necessitated the implementation of the Biggert-Waters Flood
Insurance Reform Act of 2012 (BW-12).
Second, a review of Biggert-Waters, its intended effects on
coastal properties, the overwhelming backlash against BW-12, and
eventual enactment of the Homeowner Flood Insurance
Affordability Act of 2014 (HFIAA), which repealed many portions
of BW-12, is presented.
Lastly, an analysis of the future of flood insurance regulation,
taking into account recent climate change reports and their
projections about storm events is presented and explored.
Considering climate change effects and the state of the NFIP,
options for the future of the program are presented. An assessment
of whether the HFIAA is a proper solution to the NFIP’s various
problems is proffered, followed by a proposal for a private flood
insurance market with mandatory participation. Finally, a solution
is offered in the form of a recommendation that the NFIP be
repurposed with an emphasis on land use regulation and retreat to
achieve the goal of preparation for and avoidance of hurricane flood
losses.
II. THE FEDERAL FLOOD INSURANCE FRAMEWORK
A. The Emergence of the National Flood Insurance Program

At 11:00 a.m. on September 6, 1965, the residents of South
Florida were placed under hurricane warning as Hurricane Betsy
was steadily making its way through the northern Bahamas. 10 After
plowing through the Bahamas, leaving behind a surprisingly low
casualty count of only one, the hurricane’s eye made its way to the
9. See Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-89, 128 Stat.
1020 (2014).
10. Arnold L. Sugg, The Hurricane Season of 1965, 94 MONTHLY WEATHER REV. 183, 186
(1966), available at http://www.aoml.noaa.gov/hrd/hurdat/mwr_pdf/1965.pdf.
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Florida Keys.11 Significant flooding affected the Keys, mainly due
to the Northerly winds that preceded the storm’s center; several feet
of water flooded highways and the first floors of many buildings.12
While Betsy’s forty-mile-wide eye passed over the keys, the bands
of the 600-miles-wide storm stretched north to Fort Lauderdale.13
The noticeable damage along the Florida Atlantic Coast included
considerable flooding of beach roads and low-lying properties in
Miami, Key Biscayne, and Fort Lauderdale.14 Downtown Fort
Lauderdale, in particular, was under a foot of water due to a six-foot
storm surge with some homes on Las Olas Isles submerged during
the storm.15
Completing its course through Florida, Betsy proceeded into
the Gulf of Mexico, where it sped forward directly towards
Louisiana.16 When Betsy made landfall in Louisiana at 135 mph,17
only foundations and debris were left behind.18 Overall, around
4,800 square miles of Louisiana were flooded.19 The total cost of
damage caused by Betsy was over $1.4 billion, with over $139
million in Florida alone.20 Betsy was the first billion-dollar
hurricane.21
The compounded damages from Betsy’s attack on the Gulf
Region led to an influx of unreasonably high premiums for flood
insurance from private insurers.22 Because of the unprofitability of
underwriting flood policies, few insurance companies offered flood
insurance.23 Therefore, flood victims depended on federal taxpayerfinanced disaster programs, prompting Congress to enact the
National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 (NFIA).24 In defining the
act’s purposes, Congress found that it was not economical to burden
11. Id. at 186.
12. Id.
13. 1965: Hurricane Betsy smashes ashore near New Orleans, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, Dec. 8,
2011, http://www.nola.com/175years/index.ssf/2011/12/1965_hurricane_betsy_smashes_a.html.
14. Sugg, supra note 10, at 187.
15. THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, supra note 13.
16. Sugg, supra note 10, at 187.
17. THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, supra note 13.
18. Id.
19. U.S. ARMY ENGINEER DISTRICT, NEW ORLEANS CORPS OF ENGINEERS, REPORT ON
HURRICANE BETSY 9 (Sept. 8-11, 1965), available at http://library.water-resources.us/docs/hpdc
/docs/19651100_Hurricane_Betsy.pdf.
20. Sugg, supra note 10, at 189.
21. THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, supra note 13.
22. Spinelli, supra note 2, at 435.
23. C.E.R. 1988 v. Aetna, 386 F.3d 263, 266 (3d Cir. 2004).
24. Spinelli, supra note 2, at 435.
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the private insurance market alone in an effort to make reasonable
and affordable coverage available.25 Congress also recognized that
annual losses from floods were increasing at an “alarming rate,” and
noted that the propensity for tragic loss of life and property caused
by flooding was something the “Nation cannot afford.”26 In
addressing costly disaster relief benefits, it was noted that most of
the victims are still not adequately compensated.27
B. Implementing the NFIP

In an effort to address the problem of flood losses and costly
inadequate relief, Congress declared people already living in floodprone areas should have an opportunity to buy insurance and
adequate limits of coverage as a matter of public policy.28 Adequate
limits were deemed necessary to indemnify these people for losses
due to future flood disasters.29 The two main goals of the program
were to make flood insurance available across the nation through a
cooperative effort between the federal government and the private
insurance industry and to provide flexibility.30 A flexible program
was desired to allow for insurance to provide an effective strategy
of “pooling risks, minimizing costs, and distributing burdens
equitably” between those protected by flood insurance and members
of the general public.31 Thus, it was quite clear from the time of its
enactment that Congress intended the NFIP to be a program that
adapted to the nation’s circumstances so that it could remain viable
and effective. Other enumerated purposes of the NFIA included
increasing authorized limits of coverage, identifying flood-prone
areas, requiring state and local participation and adoption of floodplain ordinances, and requiring the purchase of flood insurance by
property owners who have received federal assistance in acquiring
or improving land in identified flood hazard areas.32
The NFIP was initially supervised by the Department of
Housing and Urban Development. Upon its establishment in 1979
to assist in disaster preparation, prevention, response, and recovery,
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was tasked
25. 42 U.S.C. § 4001(b) (2012).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 4002(a)(1), (a)(5) (2014).
27. Id.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 4002(a)(6).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 4002(a)(6).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 4001(d).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 4001(d).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 4002 (b).
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with administering the NFIP.33 FEMA was authorized by Congress
to prescribe methods for adjusting claims and paying for damages
to or losses of covered properties.34 As part of its administration of
the NFIP, FEMA created the Write-Your-Own (WYO) program.35
The WYO program allows private insurers to issue policies while
acting as fiscal agents of the United States.36
Under the system created by FEMA, NFIP policies may be
issued by FEMA directly or by a WYO company, with the private
company selling insurance under its own name with the federal
government as a guarantor.37 The companies serve as administrators
of policies, while the government pays out the claims;38 however,
policies may not be altered without express authorization from
FEMA.39 Although the private companies that serve as
intermediaries for WYO policies give the impression that it is
private insurance, the policies, through their rather involved FEMA
oversight, remain federal flood insurance policies. The WYO
program has gained in popularity and, as of 2004, more than 90% of
NFIP policies were WYO.40
The NFIP does condition the issuing of these flood insurance
policies. Under the NFIP, FEMA must also oversee communities’
implementation of flood zone ordinances in order to promote “sound land
use by minimizing exposure to flood losses.”41 The purposes of the flood
zone ordinances include limiting development on land exposed to flood
damage, minimizing flood damage, guiding future construction from
flood-prone areas, and authorizing ongoing studies of flood hazards to
provide for a continuing assessment of the flood insurance program and
evaluation of the program’s impact on land use requirements.42
To be eligible for NFIP coverage, structures must be in a community
that has adopted floodplain management ordinances and must follow
FEMA’s minimum standards for construction in flood-prone areas.43
FEMA must approve the building code regulations of the applying
33. Spinelli, supra note 2, at 437.
34. C.E.R. 1988 v. Aetna, 386 F.3d 263, 267 (3d Cir. 2004).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Peal v. N. Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., Inc., 212 F. Supp. 2d 508, 513 (E.D.N.C.
2002).
38. C.E.R. 1988 v. Aetna, 386 F.3d at 267.
39. Mason v. Witt, 74 F. Supp. 2d 955, 960 (E.D. Cal. 1999).
40. Id.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 4001(c).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 4001.
43. McMillan, supra note 4, at 481.
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community.44 In an effort to mitigate damage, the NFIP requires
construction in one-hundred year floodplains to be elevated higher than
the highest recorded floodwaters, prohibits development in floodways, and
specifies construction techniques.45
In addition to the mandatory requirements of the NFIP, FEMA
provides some voluntary options. FEMA has designed a Community
Rating System that recognizes and encourages community floodplain
management activities above and beyond FEMA’s requirements with the
granting of incentives.46 The incentive comes by way of discounts to
premium rates for actions that reduce flood damage, strengthen and
support the NFIP’s insurance aspects, and encourage a comprehensive
approach to floodplain management.47 Despite the regulation of land use
and the incentives from the Community Rating System, the NFIP’s land
use framework really only serves as a condition precedent for flood
insurance coverage.
However, the NFIP’s slack is picked up in some areas by the Coastal
Barrier Resources Act of 1982 (CBRA).48 CBRA serves as a direct
response to the permitting of coastal development that has resulted in the
“loss of barrier resources, threats to human life, health, and property, and
the expenditure of millions of tax dollars each year.”49 The CBRA does
not explicitly outlaw development in barrier areas, but excludes flood
coverage under the NFIP and thereby halts development in these sensitive
coastal areas.50 This statute does not necessarily have an expansive effect
on the NFIP’s issuing of policies because it is focused solely on
undeveloped coastal barriers along the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts and the
Great Lakes shores, not all flood-prone areas.51

44. Id.
45. Id. at 501. Some examples include elevating the first floor to protect development that
proceeds in the area. Id.
46. National Flood Insurance Program Community Rating System, FEMA, (Mar. 19, 2014, 1:56
PM), http://www.fema.gov/national-flood-insurance-program-community-rating-system.
47. Id.
48. 16 U.S.C. § 3501 (2014).
49. Id.
50. Martin M. Randall, Coastal Development Run Amuck: A Policy of Retreat May Be the Only
Hope, 18 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 145, 159 (2003).
51. 16 U.S.C. § 3501 (2014). The act defines “undeveloped coastal barriers” as depositional
geologic features that are subject to wave, tidal, and wind energies, and protect landward aquatic
habitats from direct wave attack. § 3501. The definition also includes all associated aquatic habitats.
§ 3501.

116

Seattle Journal of Environmental Law

[Vol. 5:1

C. Big Storms Test the NFIP

In August 1992, the NFIP encountered a major test when
Hurricane Andrew struck South Florida and Louisiana.52 Hurricane
Andrew destroyed more than twenty five thousand homes, damaged
one hundred thousand others, killed sixty-five people, and caused
$41 billion in damage in South Florida alone.53 While greater Miami
averted major damage, the storm introduced to South Florida
citizens and governmental officials the potential destruction that a
storm like Hurricane Andrew could leave in its path.54 Decades of
minimal hurricanes and tropical storms made Hurricane Andrew a
wakeup call for South Florida's coastal residents.55 It was estimated
that major damage to South Florida might have tripled Hurricane
Andrew's immense cost.56 Hurricane Andrew’s intensity, power,
and sustained force over land were much greater than calculated.57
Hurricane Andrew was the most expensive natural disaster in
U.S. history for thirteen years.58 While the NFIP somehow managed
to keep afloat after 1968 and survive Hurricane Andrew, nothing
could have prepared the program and FEMA for the 2005 hurricane
season. A few short months after Hurricane Dennis reached the
Florida panhandle as a Category 3 storm, Tropical Storm Katrina
became Hurricane Katrina just off the coast of the MiamiDade/Broward County line on August 25, 2005.59 Hurricane Katrina
crossed Florida over the following day, entering the Gulf of Mexico
and gaining strength to become a Category 5 by August 28.60
On August 29, Hurricane Katrina’s center made landfall in
Louisiana, bringing with it a maximum wind speed that was
estimated at 125 mph.61 Hurricane Katrina made a second landfall
near the Mississippi/Louisiana border and led to storm surge
52. John Kostyack, Reforming the National Flood Insurance Program to Confront Global
Warming and Other Environmental Realities: A Win-Win for People and Wildlife, 40 NO. 2 ABA
TRENDS 12, 13 (2008).
53. Id.
54. Jonathan Brennan Butler, Insurers Under Fire: Assessing the Constitutionality of Florida's
Residential Property Insurance Moratorium After Hurricane Andrew, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 731, 732
(1995).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Kostyack, supra note 52, at 13.
59. Hurricanes in History: Hurricane Katrina 2005, NATIONAL HURRICANE CENTER,
http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/outreach/history/#katrina (last modified May 30, 2012).
60. Id.
61. Id.
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flooding of twenty-five to twenty-eight feet above normal tide levels
along the Mississippi coast and storm surge flooding of ten to twenty
feet above normal tide levels along the Louisiana coast.62 South
Florida collected ten to fourteen inches of rain, while the rest of the
inland track along the Gulf received eight to twelve inches of rain.63
Hurricane Katrina left behind over $81 billion in damages, making
it the costliest storm in United States history.64 Additionally,
Hurricane Katrina’s death toll neared approximately 1,830, making
it one of the deadliest storms in the nation’s history. 65
No more than a month later, a Category 3 hurricane named Rita
made landfall on the Texas/Louisiana border, resulting in
approximately $11.68 billion in damage and 120 casualties.66
Hurricane Rita devastated portions of Texas and Louisiana, after
first impacting the Florida Keys.67 Still, there was more to come, as
Hurricane Wilma caused $30 billion in damages and 63 casualties
exactly one month after Hurricane Rita.68
However, no matter how fearsome the 2005 hurricane season
was, coastal residents in the Gulf Region were not frightened away.
In 2006, speaking to the New York Times, Philip J. Klotzbach, a
hurricane researcher at Colorado State University, said, “[t]here is
likely to be an increase in destructiveness from tropical cyclones
regardless of whether they are getting more intense or not . . . largely
due to the increase in coastal population and wealth per capita in
hurricane-prone areas.”69 Professor Klotzbach and other climate
experts stated that the main hurricane problem facing the United
States was unabated coastal development in vulnerable places,
which was supported by a failure to change government policies and
corporate and individual behavior.70 At the time, Gulf and Atlantic
coastal construction was still going strong.71
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Kimberly E. Smith, The Go Zone Act: An Innovative Mechanism for Promoting Economic
Recovery for the Gulf Coast, 77 MISS. L.J. 807, 809 (2008).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Hurricanes in History: Hurricane Rita 2005, NATIONAL HURRICANE CENTER,
http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/outreach/history/#rita (last modified May 30, 2012).
68. Smith, supra note 64, at 809.
69. Andrew C. Revkin, Climate Experts Warn of More Coastal Building, N.Y. TIMES, July 25,
2006.
70. Id.
71. An Examination of the Availability and Affordability of Property and Casualty Insurance in
the Gulf Coast and Other Coastal Regions: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and
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Coastal population growth is expected to continue, with threequarters of the U.S. population expected by some to live within fifty
miles of a tidal or Great Lakes shoreline.72 Worse still, it was
projected that the nineteen hurricane-exposed states would be home
to more than half of the U.S. population growth between 2000 and
2030.73 There are many reasons why people choose to take up
residence near the coasts. Historically, this development had to do
with water-based transportation and commercial endeavors.74
Currently, the popularity of coastal development has some
economic reasoning, but the benefits are primarily aesthetic.75
Development near the coasts is not a new trend by any means, and
its dangers are not a surprise, but the choice to continue to move into
flood-prone areas despite the continued risk of intense storm events
does cause a rise in flood risks in these areas.76
There was no relief in sight for those who opted to develop in
those vulnerable coastal locations.77 The year of 2008 brought
Tropical Storm Fay, Hurricane Gustave, and Hurricane Ike, which,
along with the rest of the fifteen storms that season, caused an
aggregate amount of $54 billion of damages and at least $10.6
billion in losses for the insurance industry.78 The damage directly
affected Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, Alabama, and Texas.79
These storms helped to expose the various problems with the
NFIP. Many financial problems were present, which stemmed
primarily from the subsidies provided to properties that suffered
repetitive losses, as well as the many grandfathered properties in
existence, whose premiums did not accurately reflect the true risk.80
These financial concerns led the U.S. General Accounting Office to
determine that the National Flood Insurance Program was not
actuarially sound.81 An insurance program deemed to be actuarially
unsound suggests that the premiums collected for the policies are
insufficient to serve as a reserve for paying out potential catastrophic
Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. 6 (1997) (Statement of Robert Hartwig, President and Chief Economist of
Insurance Information Institute).
72. McMillan, supra note 4, at 497-98.
73. Hartwig, supra note 71.
74. McMillan, supra note 4, at 497-98.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Spinelli, supra note 2, at 439.
78. Id. at 439-440.
79. Id. at 439.
80. Id. at. 440.
81. Randall, supra note 50, at 153.
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losses.82 The unsound actuarial practices of the program are
evidenced by the fact that the program has suffered net annual losses
as high as $600 million.83 In addition to the NFIP’s financial
problems, participation was shown to be an issue after the 2005
Hurricane Season. It became evident that homeowners in certain
high risk areas were failing to comply with the mandatory coverage
requirements.84
Furthermore, FEMA has failed to accurately predict which
communities are more flood-prone than others.85 This has much to
do with another significant problem exposed by Hurricane Katrina:
inaccurate and out of date flood maps.86 Without updated maps,
residents are unable to base their decisions to build or not build in
certain areas on the flood risk, in turn making many policies
actuarially unsound.87 While it is expected that flood maps will be
updated every three to five years under the NFIP, some maps in the
Gulf Coast were nearly twenty years out of date when Hurricane
Katrina struck.88 This twenty-year period without an update is
significant, considering the fact that during that time, roads, homes,
and businesses were constructed that served to alter the coastal
landscape.89 Coastal development such as this can lead to higher
floodwaters that extend farther than the maps depict.90 With all of
these problems exposed, it quickly became clear to lawmakers that
the time had come for drastic reform to the NFIP.
III. THE BIGGERT-WATERS FLOOD INSURANCE REFORM ACT OF 2012
A. Introducing Reform to the NFIP
[T]he National Flood Insurance Program was not intended to be
a static, never-changing concept; instead, as is apparent from 42
U.S.C. § 4001(a)(4), the Program was intended and designed to respond flexibly to the reasonable needs of those for whose protection

82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Spinelli, supra note 2, at 440.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Spinelli, supra note 2, at 445.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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the Program, and the insurance policies issued under it, were addressed.91

It became apparent in the years from 2005 to 2008 that the
circumstances encountered in many coastal areas now required the
NFIP to show its true flexibility. The residents of coastal areas
desperately needed protection from the program. Thus, in 2012,
Congress passed and President Obama signed the Biggert-Waters
Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 (BW-12).92 BW-12, which
extended the NFIP for five years, required changes to flood
insurance, flood hazard mapping, grants, and the management of
floodplains.93
Congress had several reasons for reforming the NFIP. First and
foremost, the program was in substantial debt leading up to BW-12.
After 2005, the NFIP borrowed over $17 billion to pay for claims
stemming just from Hurricane Katrina.94 Hurricane Sandy hit the
Atlantic Coast in 2012, leaving the program with a debt of $30.4
billion that had been growing for nearly a decade.95 Thus, since
2006, the NFIP was considered a “high-risk” governmental program
by the Government Accountability Office.96
Another focus of the congressional reform of the NFIP was its
lack of actuarial soundness. Increasing this soundness required a
balance between cost and risk for all policyholders.97 A large
obstacle that needed to be overcome was the removal of subsidies
and grandfathered rates, which were originally implemented to
improve the affordability of high-risk areas.98 By 2012, about 20%
of all NFIP policies had subsidized rates.99 The main problem with

91. Quesada v. Dir., Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 577 F. Supp. 695 (S.D. Fla. 1983), aff'd,
753 F.2d 1011 (11th Cir. 1985) (emphasis in original).
92. FEMA, QUESTIONS ABOUT THE BIGGERT-WATERS FLOOD INSURANCE REFORM ACT OF
2012 1 (2013), available at http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1912-250459380/bw12_qa_04_2013.pdf.
93. Id.
94. Spinelli, supra note 2, at 441.
95. WETLANDS WATCH, BIGGERT-WATERS ACT REVIEW IN BRIEF 1 (July 2013), available at
http://www.wetlandswatch.org/Portals/3/WW%20documents/insurance/nfip-changes-initial.pdf.
96. J. Kevin A. McKechnie, Senior Vice President & Director ABA Office of Insurance
Advocacy, Testimony to NAIC Examination Oversight (E) Task Force, Climate Change and Global
Warming (E) Working Group: Mortgage Servicing: Flood Insurance Administration after BiggertWaters 4 (Aug. 26, 2013) (transcript available at http://www.aba.com/ABIA/Documents/McKec
hnieNAICTestimonyIndy8-26-13.pdf).
97. WETLANDS WATCH, supra note 95, at 1.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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these subsidized rates (known as “pre-FIRM”100 rates) is that they
do not reflect the actual risk associated with the properties.101 In
2006, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that only
about 60% of the premiums needed to achieve actuarial balance
were collected due to subsidized rates.102
The planned implementation of rates under BW-12 is a 25%
increase per year on pre-FIRM, non-primary residences beginning
in 2013 until the rate reflects true risk.103 Overall, BW-12 has four
major elements.104 First, some “non-conforming properties” with
below-market rates (since their communities first joined the
program) will have their rates increased.105 In an attempt to reach
full risk, grandfathered rates will be periodically discontinued.106
Full risk will be reflected in new policies for any new
policyholders.107 Second, improved maps will be used to define
flood rates, incorporating “the best available science,” including
science related to possible climate change.108 Third, the amount of
charged premiums will be raised based on these improved
maps.109 Lastly, the program may begin to implement reinsurance to
transfer a portion of the nation's flood risk to the private sector.110
These drastic changes all intended to secure the stability of the
NFIP as well as the financial futures of its policyholders. However,
it soon became evident that this new reform had its own set of issues.
B. Biggert-Waters Backlash

It may have seemed that homeowners and lawmakers were
desperate for reform to the NFIP and that BW-12 provided the
much-needed solution. After all, homeowners and lawmakers alike
in coastal states had suffered through the challenges of massive
storm and flooding events. Yet, as much as these storms led to
catastrophic effects on homes in coastal regions, a new catastrophe
100. Pre-Flood Insurance Rate Map.
101. WETLANDS WATCH, supra note 95, at 1.
102. Spinelli, supra note 2, at 442.
103. FEMA, supra note 92, at 1.
104. Lehrer, supra note 5, at 352.
105. Id.
106. FEMA, supra note 92, at 3.
107. FEMA, supra note 92, at 2. A full risk rate in flood insurance reflects both the risk assumed
by the program by the full range of possible losses, including catastrophic floods, and all
administrative expenses. Id. at 2-3.
108. Lehrer, supra note 5, at 352.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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soon became the focus of residents and politicians: increased
insurance premiums. This concern was expressed in the following
open letter to President Obama, penned by Florida Governor, Rick
Scott.
Dear Mr. President:
Your decision to sign the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 has had devastating consequences for Florida’s
families.
Over the past 35 years, Floridians have paid over $16 billion into
the National Flood Insurance Program—roughly four times more
than they have received in payments. Yet, as a result of Biggert-Waters, today many Floridians are facing the horror of losing their homes
due to soaring flood insurance costs.
.
.
.
Act now and undo the effects of this mistaken law before it cripples Florida’s real-estate market, harms even more Floridians, and
reverses our state’s burgeoning economic recovery.
Sincerely,
Rick Scott
Governor [of the State of Florida]111

In 2013, FEMA began phasing in higher premiums as part of BW12.112 These initial increases applied primarily to second homes and
properties that had been transferred from one owner to another.113 BW-12
initially had broad and enthusiastic support from liberal environmentalists
and fiscal conservatives alike.114 Conservatives liked the Act’s plan to
rapidly curb government spending on flood insurance.115
Environmentalists liked the inclusion of a reflection of the true cost of
climate change, which scientists say is “ushering in an era of rising sea
levels and more damaging extreme weather, including more flooding.”116
However, in 2013, coastal homeowners saw new flood insurance
rates that were as much as ten times higher than before.117 Some premiums

111. Letter from Gov. Rick Scott, Florida, to President Barack Obama, supra note 7.
112. Flood Insurance Reform, FEMA (Apr. 16, 2014, 5:16 PM), http://www.fema.gov/floodinsurance-reform.
113. Id.
114. Coral Davenport, Popular Flood Insurance Law Is Target of Both Political Parties, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 28, 2014, at A14.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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increased by thousands of dollars.118 Many of these unexpected rate
increases were a result of 2012’s Hurricane Sandy. The storm wreaked
havoc on the northeast United States, especially New York and New
Jersey, and was consistent with a pattern of climate change producing
more severe weather.119 Although only a Category 1 storm, Sandy still
managed to produce around $33 billion worth of damage.120 According to
certain estimations, had Sandy reached Category 4, she could have caused
nearly $500 billion worth of damage.121
Sandy was a wake-up call to many residents who had been affected
by the destruction, leaving them to choose between two difficult realities:
accept a rate increase of up to $30,000 a year, or pay the necessary amount
to rebuild a home to FEMA’s necessary standards.122 Being confronted
with this dilemma was shocking to the people of New York, many of
whom had built their homes well before the first flood maps were drawn
in 1974 and, thus, had always been protected by subsidized rates.123 No
longer could these residents rely on comfortably reasonable premiums;
BW-12 was changing their flood insurance policies in a dramatic way.
In response to numerous complaints, Congress called in the director
of FEMA, Craig Fugate, to demand a stop to the law it had passed just a
year before.124 Most surprisingly, Representative Maxine Waters of
California, a sponsor of the original law and one of its namesakes, had
become one of the most outraged parties.125 She now sought to gut the law
she had sponsored, which she described as having been “well-meaning,”
adding, “Never in our wildest dreams did we think the premium increases
would be what they appear to be today.”126 Rep. Waters told Director
Fugate at a congressional hearing, "Let me just say, all of the harm that
has been caused to thousands of people across the country —[who] are
calling us, [who] are going to lose their homes, [who] are placed in this
position — is just unconscionable."127

118. Joyce, supra note 8.
119. Erica Mattison, Underwater: The Need for Massachusetts to Become Climate Ready, 8 FLA.
A & M U. L. REV. 327, 328 (2013).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Tara Siegel Bernard, Rebuilding After Sandy, but With Costly New Rules, N.Y. TIMES, May
10, 2013, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/11/your-money/after-hurricanesandyrebuilding-under-higher-flood-insurance.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
123. Id.
124. Joyce, supra note 6.
125. Id.
126. Davenport, supra note 114.
127. Joyce, supra note 8.
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C. Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014

In response to the public outcry over increased flood insurance
premiums, lawmakers began actively working towards a delay of
BW-12. On January 30, 2014, the Senate passed a bill known as the
Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014
(HFIAA).128 Passing by sixty-seven to thirty-two and co-sponsored
by Robert Menendez, Democrat of New Jersey, and Johnny Isakson,
Republican of Georgia, the bill was to delay rate increases and
effectively gut BW-12.129 Four-year retention of flood insurance
subsidies was to halt premium hikes and give FEMA time to conduct
an affordability study and check the accuracy of its flood maps.130
Homeowners who were never previously in a high-risk flood zone
would be grandfathered into lower rates.131
Many were in strong opposition to the HFIAA. Because the bill
aimed to delay most increases for four years (beyond the five-year
extension the initial act created), budget watchdogs, insurance
groups and environmentalists argued that the effort to delay BW-12
“would bankrupt the program and leave coastal property owners
more vulnerable to future damages, and that taxpayers would be
forced to pay the bill.”132 Before the Senate passed the bill, the
White House released a statement saying that gutting BW-12 would
further erode the financial position of NFIP, reducing the
government’s ability to distribute future flood claims.133 Senator
Patrick J. Toomey of Pennsylvania, who alternately proposed an
amendment to BW-12, criticized the bill passed by the Senate,
saying, “We go right back to the insolvent, unsustainable program
we had before.”134 Many of the parties who opposed the bill pointed
to a recent CBO analysis that suggested that a delay would cost the
NFIP $2.1 billion in losses over ten years.135 The program is already
$24 billion in debt.136
However, the bill succeeded largely because it garnered
significant support from both parties in the Senate. Both prominent
128. Andrew G. Simpson, Senate Passes Flood Insurance Delay, Agent Licensing Bill, INS. J.
(Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2014/01/30/318963.html.
129. Davenport, supra note 114, at A19.
130. Simpson, supra note 128.
131. Id.
132. Davenport, supra note 114.
133. Id.
134. Davenport, supra note 114.
135. King, supra note 3.
136. Davenport, supra note 114.
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liberals and conservatives alike supported the bill, such as Senator
Elizabeth Warren, Democrat of Massachusetts, and Senator Marco
Rubio, Republican of Florida.137 Senator Rubio, who said, "I'll vote
for this bill and I'll support it because it's important to prevent these
rate increases from going forward, but I would like to find some
long-term certainty to this," joined fellow Florida Senator Bill
Nelson, Democrat.138 Senator Nelson’s main focus was on freezing
the rates before they caused irreversible damage, saying, "It's not
fair that people are suddenly having to pay 10 times what they were
just paying."139 Although Senator Nelson found that the bill’s
delaying provision was a good start, he expressed concern for those
people trying to buy or sell homes in the areas in Florida determined
by FEMA to be flood risks.140 A bipartisan agreement similar to that
of Florida’s senators was presented in Louisiana. Senator Mary
Landrieu, Democrat, was joined in her support of the delay bill by
Representative Bill Cassidy, Republican of Baton Rouge, her former
opponent in the race for Senate.141
With general success in the Senate, the next step for the
proposed delay of BW-12 was a vote from the House of
Representatives. Originally, House Speaker John Boehner stated
explicitly that the House was “not going to do that.”142 Although
Speaker Boehner did not support a repeal of BW-12, he was open to
alternative ideas to modify the law.143 The issue of the House vote
initially seemed far from settled. Democratic Senator Charles E.
Schumer, of New York, stated, “When this bill passes the House,
millions of homeowners across America will breathe a sigh of
relief.”144
In the end, a slightly different version of the same Act was
signed by President Obama on March 21, 2014, which was intended
to delay the implementation of certain provisions of BW-12.145
Specifically, the HFIAA focuses on lowering certain rate increases
137. Davenport, supra note 114.
138. King, supra note 135.
139. Id.
140. Bruce Alpert, House Speaker Boehner says House won't take up bill on 4-year delay in
flood insurance increases, but more modest change possible, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Jan. 16, 2014, 3:54
PM, http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2014/01/speaker_boehner_says_house_won.html.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Davenport, supra note 114.
145. Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-89, 128 Stat. 1020
(2014).
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and repealing others, refunding excess premiums to some in the
latter category.146 With limited exceptions, the law guarantees that
rates will not increase more than 18% annually.147 The new law also
repeals the portion of BW-12 that eliminated grandfathered rates for
coverage in certain cases.148 Additionally, HFIAA requires that
FEMA prepare a draft affordability framework, to be completed
after the affordability study required by BW-12.149 HFIAA also
requires that mapping be certified as based on “technically credible”
data and approaches.150 One controversial feature of the new law
requires a surcharge from all policyholders to offset the continuing
existence of subsidies.151 FEMA announced on April 15, 2014, that
“effective May 1, people who purchased new homes after BiggertWaters became law on July 6, 2012, or who didn't have insurance
before that date, or whose insurance lapsed, will revert back to
premium schedules in effect Oct. 1, 2013.”152 With that, the months
of debate over insurance reform and the possibility of solving the
NFIP’s problems were tossed aside to return to the status quo.
IV. THE FUTURE OF FLOOD POLICY: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

The NFIP’s problems are not likely to solve themselves, so it is
essential that changes are made to the program. However, this opens
the door for many conflicts about which direction reform should
lead the program, as residents and lawmakers in nearly all coastal
states, especially Florida, have a stake in the conversation. Several
factors are relevant in determining what the next step should be for
this controversial area of law and policy. Section A of Part IV of this
paper focuses on recent scientific conclusions about climate change
and recommends that lawmakers rely on these conclusions for wise
flood insurance decision-making. Section B argues that the
HFIAA’s stalling of reform is not the proper technique for
strengthening the flawed flood insurance program because it ignores
146. FEMA, HOMEOWNER FLOOD INSURANCE AFFORDABILITY ACT OF 2014 OVERVIEW 1 (Mar.
4, 2014), available at http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1396551935597
-4048b68f6d695a6eb6e6e7118d3ce464/HFIAA_Overview_FINAL_03282014.pdf.
147. Id. at 2.
148. Id. at 3.
149. Id. at 4.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 3. “A policy for a primary residence will include a $25 surcharge. All other policies
will include a $250 surcharge.” Id.
152. Bruce Alpert, First premium relief from new flood insurance law implemented by FEMA,
THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, Apr. 15, 2014, 12:01 PM, http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf
/2014/04/first_premium_relief_from_new.html.
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its continually escalating financial and actuarial problems. Section
C explores the possibility of abandoning the existing federal
framework to instead impose a privatized market for flood insurance
that requires participation by homeowners to relieve the overall
burden on the risk pool. Lastly, Section D proposes a repurposing of
the NFIP to focus less on flood insurance and more on coastal
regulation and retreat, generally avoiding debt from numerous
massive flood claims altogether. These varied possibilities, if
properly implemented, could mean more successful preparation for
extreme storm events.
A. Reform Must Reflect Current Climate Change Science

While the focus of the debate over Biggert-Waters seems to
revolve primarily around cost, one issue that has been generally
overlooked is the impact of climate change on the future of flood
insurance. Several reports and papers have reached many important
conclusions about the future of climate change, and lawmakers
should not ignore its effects on tropical cyclones and flooding. The
primary source of climate change information for the global
community comes from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC), which is comprised of several hundred scientists
who have released five reports since 1998.153 The Panel’s most
recent 2014 report, preceded by a draft report released in 2013,
makes clear that there is substantial evidence that climate change
has affected all continents and oceans.154 2013’s draft report linked
these effects to human activity, naming it the dominant cause.155 The
2014 report takes on these climate change impacts as a series of risks
and points out as gravest the risks to people in low-lying coastal
areas exposed to storm surges, coastal flooding, and sea-level rise,
as well as those risks to people living in large urban areas who must
worry about inland flooding that could wipe out homes and

153. Justin Gillis, Climate Panel Cites Near Certainty on Warming, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2013,
at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/20/science/earth/extremely-likely-that-humanactivity-is-driving-climate-change-panel-finds.html?pagewanted=all.
154. Suzanne Goldenberg, IPCC report: climate change felt 'on all continents and across the
oceans', THE GUARDIAN, Mar. 28, 2014, 8:48 AM, http://www.theguardian.com/environme
nt/2014/mar/28/ipcc-report-climate-change-report-human-natural-systems.
155. Id.
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businesses.156 The report also expresses that some of the effects of
climate change may be irreversible.157
Nearly coinciding with the release of the 2013 ICPP draft report
was FEMA’s release of a report concerning the impact of climate
change on the NFIP. Replete with findings and recommendations,
the report addressed the expected changes in climate that will affect
flood insurance policies through the year 2100.158 In reference to
coastal environments, the report determined that special flood
hazard areas are projected to increase by about 55% by the year 2100
if shorelines remain fixed, or by 40% if the shorelines recede.159
Looking specifically at the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts, the average
growth of flood hazard areas, with fixed shorelines, could be nearer
to 100% by 2100.160 The National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) has determined that approximately eight
million people in the U.S. already live in coastal areas at risk of
flooding.161 Thus, should the projections of the FEMA report be
accurate, an immense number of people will likely find themselves
in flood hazard areas. Additionally, coastal areas are home to many
of the nation's military, energy, and commercial assets.162 These
critical areas also will become more susceptible to flooding if the
FEMA projections are correct.
Much of the effect that climate change could have on coastal
flood zones in the future involves precipitation and storm events
rather than rising sea levels. The frequency of heavy precipitation
events in the U.S. is projected to increase.163 Such events are
expected to occur about every four to fifteen years by 2100, whereas
currently they occur closer to once every twenty years.164 The
warming of tropical sea surface temperature will likely lead to an
156. IPCC WORKING GROUP II, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND
VULNERABILITY – CHAPTER 19: EMERGENT RISKS AND KEY VULNERABILITIES 3 (2013), available at
http://ipcc-wg2.gov/AR5/images/uploads/WGIIAR5-Chap19_FGDall.pdf.
157. Goldenberg, supra note 154.
158. AECOM, THE IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND POPULATION GROWTH ON THE
NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM THROUGH 2100 (Margaret Davidson et. al. eds. 2013).
159. Id. at 144.
160. Id.
161. Wendy Koch, NOAA sees sea level rise of up to 6.6 feet by 2100, USA TODAY, Dec. 6,
2012, 7:09 PM, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2012/12/06/noaa-sea-levelrise/1750945/.
162. Id.
163. Future Precipitation Storm Events, EPA: FUTURE CLIMATE CHANGE,
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/science/future.html (last updated Mar. 4, 2014).
164. Id.
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increase in the intensity of Atlantic hurricanes, specifically by an
increase in hurricane rainfall rates and wind speeds of the strongest
hurricanes.165 The level of confidence in these various projections
means that many dramatic changes driven by climate change will
have severe impacts for coastal areas in states like Florida. What is
less certain is how much these startling projections will be taken into
account when reevaluating coastal development regulation and
flood insurance.
B. Delaying True Reform: Is HFIAA the Right Move?

It is important to determine what the practical effects of delays
in updating rates and flood maps and making meaningful changes
might mean for the NFIP. In light of the conclusions presented by
the IPCC report, it seems clear that storm-related flood events may
worsen in the future. Yet, the government has chosen to take a
course that fails to account for any changing circumstances and
keeps the regulatory framework for flood insurance coverage
essentially the same as it has been since 1968. The proposed fouryear delay for rate increases and two-year affordability study that
would be required would extend beyond 2017, the year in which the
restructuring mandated by BW-12 would have ended. In this amount
of time, any number of severe tropical cyclones can pummel our
coastlines and lead the NFIP into greater debt. While the HFIAA
does not entirely repeal all of BW-12, it essentially removes its teeth
and fails to give the NFIP a fighting chance to recover. This lack of
recovery period could be significant for the program that, even six
years later, is still reeling from the awe-inspiring effects of
Hurricane Katrina and her cyclonic siblings.
An affordability study seems as though it may provide a proper
reform and address the program’s needs; it should require an
analysis of private and federal interests to determine what the
appropriate costs for effectively managing the NFIP would be. John
Young, President of Jefferson Parish in Louisiana, argued for delay
by stating that “Congress must consider long-term solutions that
balance fiscal responsibility with insurance premium
affordability.”166 Therefore, at a glance, the HFIAA’s proposed
delay and affordability study could be the correct choice for the
165. Id.
166. John Young, Guest commentary: Biggert-Waters an assault on the American Dream, THE
ADVOCATE (Nov. 21, 2013), http://theadvocate.com/news/opinion/7583497-123/guest-commentarybiggert-waters-an-assault.
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NFIP and FEMA. In the short term, homeowners gain some relief
and peace of mind in knowing that flood insurance premiums will
not skyrocket for at least four years. In the long term, policyholders,
as well as policymakers, can rest assured that a proper balance will
be struck, as informed by the mandatory affordability study. In that
this plan considers both short-term and long-term benefits, it is
reasonable to believe it will be successful. However, it is the period
of time that bridges the short term to the long term that will prove
problematic.
To understand the problem, one need only examine the
circumstances that led to reform in 2012 in the first place. The
monumental debt that FEMA and the NFIP acquired was the driving
force for reform, and to delay that much needed reform would do
nothing to alleviate that debt. Homeowners will be temporarily
appeased, but at what cost? The result may very well be a total
collapse of the NFIP, or simply a later increase of premiums, which
by then will only be more necessary and more drastic.
To argue on behalf of the pocketbooks of the homeowners as
the important reason for stalling reform of the NFIP is not only onesided, but nearsighted. Michael Hecht, president and CEO of
Greater New Orleans Inc. and the Coalition for Sustainable Flood
Insurance, appeals to this sentiment by emphasizing that 55% of
Americans live within fifty miles of the coast, and that, “if the
Administration wants to address income inequality, it can begin by
ensuring that millions of Americans do not lose their homes.”167
This argument is valid, if narrow. Its foundational fault is the fact
that the NFIP was not created with only homeowners in mind. In
enacting the NFIA, Congress considered various interests, including
private homeowners, private insurers, local governments, and the
national economy. The mandatory affordability study will also take
into account all of these interests. To let the NFIP’s debt continue to
escalate while an affordability study determines the inevitable
conclusion that the necessary reform will, in fact, be costly would
be to ignore the reasons why the NFIP exists in the first place.
Unfortunately, the HFIAA is not a solution to the NFIP’s problems;
it is merely an avoidance of the problems the program is facing.

167. Michael Hecht, Why Obama Should Support Delaying Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance
Hikes: Opinion, INS. JOURNAL (Jan. 28, 2014), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/na
tional/2014/01/28/318660.htm.
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C. Repeal BW-12 and HFIAA; Make Room for Private Insurance

Though Congress’s main focus in passing the HFIAA was on
delaying the effects of BW-12, the idea of more meaningfully
repealing the act altogether was expressed. Representative Tom
Marino of Pennsylvania introduced one such bill.168 His proposal
would fully strike all policy aspects of BW-12, especially essential
language that leads to rate increases.169 This option gained little
traction in comparison to other bills proposing to delay BW-12
(including several which Representative Marino himself has
supported).170 However, this route leaves room for an interesting
possibility: if BW-12 were repealed, the next step would be to repeal
HFIAA right along with it. In this scenario, it may become necessary
for the NFIP, in its current iteration, to be abandoned or restructured
from the bottom up due to extreme debt. Thus, new legislation
would need to be created to solve the problem of flooding in the
United States.
The next step in this scenario may be to return to private
insurance, just as was standard when the NFIP was first created and
which was later outlined as a goal for BW-12.171 The purpose of
such a strategy would be to relieve the U.S. treasury from having to
pay out massive losses when major storm events occur. While the
current framework of the NFIP does give some control to private
insurers through the issuance of WYOs, both the policies and the
program are still actually governed by FEMA.172 Of course, the
problem that arises from such a decision is the one that led to
FEMA’s control of the program in the first place: inability of private
insurers to sustain the overwhelming cost of the risk of flood
insurance.173 The NFIP’s significant financial woes are evidence
enough of the fact that the cost of insuring coastal, flood-prone
property is a daunting task.174
The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) recently
prepared a report to congressional committees entitled “Flood
Insurance: Strategies for Increasing Private Sector Involvement” in
168. Press Release, U.S. Rep. Tom Marino, Marino Introduces Legislation to Repeal BiggertWaters (Jan. 7, 2014), available at http://marino.house.gov/press-release/marino-introduceslegislation-repeal-biggert-waters.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See Lehrer, supra note 5, at 352.
172. C.E.R. 1988 v. Aetna, 386 F.3d 263, 267 (3d Cir. 2004).
173. See Spinelli, supra note 2, at 437.
174. See WETLANDS WATCH, supra note 95, at 1; see Davenport, supra note 114.

132

Seattle Journal of Environmental Law

[Vol. 5:1

response to the debate over flood insurance reform.175 The report
recommended certain strategies that would promote private market
involvement in flood insurance.176 One condition is for the NFIP to
charge full-risk rates for flood policies, with only very specific
scenarios for granting a subsidy, so that private insurers, who cannot
provide subsidies, would be competitive while offering the same
full-risk rates.177 Additionally, continued federal involvement
would be necessary, by way of reinsurance to prepare for
catastrophic loss or as a residual market for the highest risk
properties.178 One issue that would require additional creativity
would be attaining more customers for private market flood
insurance, as the lack of participation limits the risk pool and makes
management difficult.179
The solution to this participation problem for private insurance
borrows from another area of insurance: health insurance. Taking a
page from the Affordable Care Act, a private market of insurers
could be established for flood insurance with the stipulation that all
homeowners participate in the market to contribute premiums that
will allow for the private market to have the ability to handle the risk
of flood disasters.180 Increasing participation in the flood insurance
program would enlarge the risk pool and, thus, reduce premiums.
Additionally, if private market insurance becomes sustainable and
has successful participation, dependence on FEMA would be
eliminated, giving the agency an opportunity to refocus towards
general disaster preparation and recovery. This distancing from
reliance on complete federal funding would allow for an opportunity
to recover and begin reducing the massive current debt of the
NFIP.181
The private market for flood insurance is already making strides
in Florida, where the state Senate unanimously passed a measure

175. GAO, FLOOD INSURANCE: STRATEGIES FOR INCREASING PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT
2 (2014), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/660309.pdf.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179 Id. at 17.
180. See generally 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(f) (2014); see also Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
181. Andrew G. Simpson, How to Encourage Private Flood Insurance; Why Delaying BiggertWaters Is Not the Answer, INSURANCE JOURNAL (Jan. 24, 2014), http://www.insurancejournal.
com/news/national/2014/01/24/318297.htm.
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that provides homeowners with private alternatives to the NFIP.182
Florida’s relationship with the NFIP is rather strained, as Florida
contains 37% of all the NFIP’s policies yet has only received $3.7
billion of the $50 billion paid out in the history of the program.183
About 268,500 homeowners in Florida had subsidized policies from
the NFIP that would have been exposed to significant rate increases
due to BW-12.184
The Florida plan allows for homeowners to purchase less
coverage than is required by the NFIP, which has limits of $250,000
for a home and $100,000 for personal property.185 Under the Florida
measure, a homeowner could choose to insure only her outstanding
mortgage balance, the home’s replacement cost, or the home’s
actual cash value.186 While these options for homeowners will likely
have broad appeal and, thus, increase participation in insurance, they
do not protect development in flood-prone areas. These
homeowners will receive what they pay for; in the case of a
catastrophic flood event, they will only be minimally covered.
However, in the end, this strategy may support the larger goal of
rescuing at least a portion of the national economy by avoiding a
further accumulation of debt due to the NFIP.
D. Redesigning the NFIP with a Focus on Regulating Coastal Development

Enacting the HFIAA essentially erased any significant memory
of the reform that was BW-12. The current solution that Congress
selected is to delay any true reform of the NFIP for the time being.
Meanwhile, the other possibility––breaking down the NFIP by
taking an extreme shift toward private market insurance––would be
far too complex and problematic. Therefore, the most practical
solution may be some middle ground where all interests are
considered. SmarterSafer.org, a group representing environmental,
taxpayer, insurer, and housing interests, commented on Senate’s
vote to delay BW-12, stating, “Today’s vote further underscores the
need to modify, rather than abandon, badly needed reforms to the
182. Mary Ellen Klas, Florida Senate passes bill to launch private flood insurance option,
TAMPA BAY TIMES, Mar. 26, 2014, 2:43 PM, http://www.tampabay.com/news/business/banki
ng/florida-senate-passes-bill-to-launch-private-flood-insurance-option/2172052.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
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National Flood Insurance Program.”187 This statement is accurate. If
one thing has become evident, it is that there needs to be a change
in the NFIP, or else the outcome may not be agreeable.
Luckily, much of what may be necessary to revitalize the NFIP
is already within the program’s parameters. While the program is
directly named for its main activity, flood insurance, it also contains
distinct control over land use and regulation of coastal development.
One of the NFIP’s main purposes has long been “to encourage state
and local governments to be more active in regulating the
development and use of land that is exposed to potential flood
damage, thereby relieving the federal government of the heavy
burden of flood disaster relief.”188 The NFIP contains language that
grants it the power to promote proper land use to avoid flood
damage.189 Additionally, the Community Rating System provides
incentive for those homeowners who go above and beyond the
requirements of FEMA’s regulations.190 Where the NFIP fails to
enforce land use regulations, the Coastal Barrier Resource Act
actually steps in to take care of the job, excluding NFIP coverage to
protect life and property.191 Although land use and mitigation have
not been the hotly contested topic of flood insurance reform, the
subjects are certainly relevant. There must be a balanced
compromise between insurance and land use regulation to create a
sound coastal flood policy.
One solution that would relieve some pressure from of the
insurance side of the program would be a restructuring of the current
regulatory framework. One new focus could be construction
regulation to prevent and correct disaster damage. This solution
would not look solely to an adjustment of premiums as a solution to
the NFIP’s debts, which in the past has been a reactive approach to
managing disaster losses. When a major storm such as Betsy or
Katrina comes around, the government scrambles to adjust and
lessen the blow to our regulatory structure. Rather than this
haphazard remedial approach, proactive implementation of stronger
land use measures could be the solution the NFIP needs.
The CBRA serves as a strong example of what the NFIP could
do with regard to land use regulation. The act focuses on avoiding
187. Simpson, supra note 128.
188. Beverly v. Macy, 702 F.2d 931 (11th Cir. 1983).
189. 42 U.S.C. § 4001(c).
190. FEMA, supra note 46.
191. See Randall, supra note 50, at 159.
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damage to coastal areas, particularly barriers, and any ecosystem or
construction that this protected area entails.192 With this strict goal
in mind, the act makes it necessary to give a firm “no” to certain
proposed developments. What the CBRA recognizes is that certain
coastal harms are inevitable. With support from the IPCC report, one
can only expect that these harms are here to stay. 193 The CBRA
essentially determines that these coastal regions are not to be
inhabited due to the loss that will almost surely occur; it would be
wasteful to continue to allow the same buildings to be erected in
these areas. The overall message of the CBRA: retreat from the
coasts.
Meanwhile, the NFIP’s main goal has always been to provide
affordable and accessible flood insurance.194 No matter how
extreme the storms or the debt, the focus on affordability remained.
When desperately needed reform finally arrived in the form of BW12, homeowners and lawmakers alike scoffed at the idea of having
to pay more for protection against an inevitable and escalating harm.
Upon moving to and constructing a home in a flood-prone coastal
zone, one can generally rely on the certainty that FEMA and the
NFIP will provide the necessary relief after big, bad storms. The
overall message is that residents should feel free to move to a floodprone area. Also, because of the NFIP’s failure to update premiums,
the second part of the message is an assurance that residents will be
charged far less than needed to sustain the program. Regulating
development is an afterthought for the NFIP because the preference
is simply to rebuild after a storm, as promised.
Proposing an increase in land use and construction regulation
through the power of the NFIP shifts the strategy of the program to
one that promotes retreat and thereby avoids and mitigates hurricane
flood damage to insured properties. In a coastal state like Florida,
this would mean that residents in hazardous flood zones would lose
the safety net of flood insurance payouts when a storm hits. It would
not be long before many residents made the choice to stop rebuilding
their homes along Florida’s many beaches and began to seek
landward shelter. This proposition is not without controversy. The
debate is often politicized, as exemplified by Democratic Gov.
Andrew Cuomo in New York pushing a retreat approach to relocate
flood victims, while Republican Gov. Chris Christie in New Jersey
192. 16 U.S.C. § 3501.
193. See generally Goldenberg, supra note 154.
194. 42 U.S.C. §4002 (a)(6).
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“has jumped aboard the bandwagon against the NFIP and against
FEMA, assailing them at town hall meetings as agents of sloth and
caution in a moment of urgent citizen need.”195
The reason that strict land use regulation is a necessary option
is because continued funding of flood insurance in high-risk areas is
a losing game. The solution to the program’s failings was packaged
nicely in BW-12, but it was rejected. So rather than spending time
on an affordability study that will only show the obvious conclusion
that flood insurance is not affordable, the government must commit
time and energy into repurposing the NFIP as a land use and
development planning tool for vulnerable coastal areas. The
program could use its insurance framework to mitigate the effects of
catastrophic losses when they occur on a massive scale, but for the
most part the losses should be avoided by proper foresight and
regulation.
Even without retreat, the systems already in place are powerful
enough to create a solid foundation for sustainable development.
Even if the NFIP doesn’t last, some of the coastal construction will,
so long as it is built with scientific advancement in mind, as well as
the well-known threat of future cyclone events. After many years of
extending a helping hand to homeowners, with few expectations in
return, the United States must pull the hand away and lay down some
strict rules.
Though slightly extreme compared to the United States’ flood
policy approach, the strategy of the Netherlands serves as a
fascinating case study not of retreat but of preparedness and
foresight. In a particular Dutch province twelve feet below sea level,
hydrologists ensure that no event like Hurricane Sandy will ever
harm their coasts by utilizing an advanced defensive system of flood
control to block storm surges.196 While the method is highly
scientific, it is the philosophy towards disaster that is most shocking.
Rather than focusing on disaster relief and disaster management,
like the U.S., the focus in the Netherlands is on disaster avoidance
and anticipating and minimizing the risk of flooding.197 In the
Netherlands, the focus is planning and design that will benefit all
195. Scott Gabriel Knowles, Flood Zone Foolishness, SLATE, Mar. 23, 2014, 11:47 PM,
http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/science/2014/03/biggert_waters_and_nfip_flood_i
nsurance_should_be_strengthened.html.
196. Andrew Higgins, Lessons for U.S. from a Flood-Prone Land, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2012,
at A6. While there are no hurricanes in the Netherlands, there are ferocious storms which pose a serious
threat to the two-thirds of the population who live in flood-prone areas. Id.
197. Id.
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residents, not an endless stream of unsustainable, unaffordable
insurance coverage. It is time for U.S. flood insurance and disaster
policy to go Dutch.
V. CONCLUSION

The National Flood Insurance Program began with the simple
intention to help homeowners. Unfortunately, the program’s
selflessness has led it down a path of instability and dire financial
straits. Now is the time for the program to propel itself into the future
as a smarter, more streamlined program that accounts for climate
change effects, changes in development in coastal zones, true risk,
available science, and its own massive debts. One thing is certain:
the NFIP will not last much longer if no action is taken to repair it
and save it from debt.
The options that may save the NFIP are drastic, but they could
be the catalyst for change in the right direction. Support from a
private market of insurers, giving much needed relief to the federal
government, would be welcomed with open arms. Alternatively, a
repurposing of the program with a focus on land use and
development regulation could do more than just alter the program’s
principles, but could actually alter societal attitudes toward disaster
preparedness and climate change. Better yet, the NFIP could
combine both recommendations to assure its future strength and
prosperity. It will take time and much more debate before another
round of drastic reforms occur, but one can only hope that the
change arrives before the next big storm does.
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